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The objectives of the present paper are twofold. First, we aim to synthesize the two strands of the 
literature on the incentive effect of intergovernmental transfers, the decentralized leadership and the 
soft budget problem both of which address the discretionary nature of the central transfer policy. We 
develop a simple decentralized leadership model in which the local governments move first and the 
central government transfer scheme is decided ex post. The ex post discretion of transfer by the 
central government pursuing social welfare distorts the ex ante incentive of the local governments, 
inducing the strategic action of the latter government. This paper also shows that the direction of the 
ex ante distortion moral hazard problem relies on what decision is made ex ante by type of authority 
is given to the local government, namely public expenditure or tax collection ex ante. Second we 
examine the robustness of the incentive problem. The benchmark model incorporates spillovers and 
is extended in several directions, including tax competition and distortionary taxes, and two period 
setting. The essence of the incentive problem remains the same.   
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In the federalism literature, intergovernmental transfers have been discussed from the 
normative standpoint as device to cope with inefficiency and inequity in a decentralized 
fiscal system in which local level governments are granted autonomy to decide their 
public spending and taxes within their jurisdictions (Boadway and Hobson (1996)). To 
be more specific, if properly designed the transfers serve to internalize fiscal 
externalities/ spillovers and assure fiscal equity equalizing net fiscal benefits across 
regions. The political economy consideration accounting for the incentive of the central 
authority pursuing own interest may change implications of the central transfer policy, 
however as being addressed by the public choice literature. Not only self interested 
nature of the central government, but its commitment ability has been increasingly 
concerned as well. The time consistency literature has raised the pervasive incentive 
consequences due to lack of the commitment of the central government despite its 
benevolent objective (Fisher (1980)).   
 
There are two strands of the literature on the commitment problem in the context of 
intergovernmental transfers. The soft budget literature has addressed the ex ante 
moral hazard or adverse incentive consequences on the local governments in the 
anticipation of the ex post bailing out by the central government in the pursuit of the ex 
post objective. The soft budget problem describes “the situation when an entity (say a 
province) can manipulate its access to funds in undesirable way “(Rodden et al (2003)) 
and is formulated in the context of the sequential game the local government moving 
first and the central government deciding transfer policy after the local fiscal status is 
revealed (See Inman (2003)). Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) establish the soft budget   3
as the incentive problem due to time inconsistency in the context of relationship 
between lender and borrower in credit market as well. The modeling may be analogous 
to the Samaritan’s dilemma with the grant recipient acting as a Stakelberg leader 
accounting for the ex post behavior of the bailing out/grant providing principle. The 
benevolency of the latter is not necessarily needed, however, for this problem to arise. 
Goodspeed (2002) models political economy of the soft budget. Von Hagen and Dahlbeng 
(2002) address political motive of the center in bailing out indebted regions as well  2  
 
The equilibrium consequence is mixed. The local government may become too large, 
overspending and/or over-borrowing, or may be too small exerting little tax effort and 
thus raising less own revenue. Wildasin (1997) for instance, establishes that in the 
presence of inter-regional spillovers, there arises “under-provision” of local own expense 
a large size jurisdiction being bailed out more frequently which is known as “Too big to 
fail” principle.   
 
The second strand is the literature on decentralized leadership that has addressed the 
ex ante horizontal and reciprocal externalities with the central government acting as a 
Stakerberg follower and local governments as leaders but established different 
implications from the soft budget problem. Caplan et al (2000) argue that efficient 
allocation of locally provided public services is achieved when inter-regional spillovers 
are present. The ex post transfer serves to internalize the spillover effect, the transfer 
being lump-sum ex post but being perceived as matching form by the regions ex ante. 
                                                  
2As is well known, the concept of the soft budget was first proposed by Kornai (1986) in the 
context of socialist economy. For a comprehensive survey on the theory of the soft budget, 
see Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2003), Qian and Roland (1998), Dewatripont, Maskin, 
Roland (2000), Dewatripont and Roland (2000). Interestingly, in the federalism literature, 
the soft budget has often characterized a feature of “decentralized fiscal system” but a close 
fiscal tie between governments remaining and/or task assignment being ambiguous.   4
Köthenbürger (2004) introduces the horizontal tax competition into the decentralized 
leadership model and shows that whereas inefficiency created by tax competition is 
internalized, inefficiency is created due to transfer so exhibiting the trade-off. In Caplan 
et al (2000), the ex ante horizontal interaction is through the spillover generating 
expenditure, cost of which being shared nation wide by the ex post intergovernmental 
transfer, whereas Köthenbürger (2004) considers the horizontal externality on the 
revenue side.   
 
The present paper aims to synthesize the decentralized leadership and the soft budget 
problem. We develop a simple decentralized leadership model in which the local 
governments move first and the transfer scheme is decided ex post. The difference 
between soft budget and decentralized leadership lies that the former as formulated by 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) is basically partial equilibrium model addressing ex 
post fiscal tie between principal and his agent whereas the latter accounts for general 
equilibrium effect that gives rise to ex ante horizontal externalities among local 
governments. In both, the ex post discretion by the central government pursuing social 
welfare distorts the ex ante incentive of the local governments that induces the strategic 
reaction of the latter. In this respect, the mechanism of decentralized leadership is 
identical to the soft budget, both of which addresses commitment problem.   
 
We establish that the direction of the ex ante distortion relies on what decision is made 
ex ante by the local government, namely public expenditure or tax collection. In the 
fiscal competition literature, it is well-known that expenditure competition and tax one 
exhibit different equilibrium consequences, but in both the result is “under-provision” or 
“under-taxation” relative to the full cooperation outcome (Wildasin (1989)). With ex post 
discretion on the intergovernmental transfers, the ex ante horizontal interaction   5
through tax collection effort giver rise to qualitatively different result from the one 
through expenditure, with “under-taxation” being the case in the former and local 
governments over-spending in the latter. That is, it is not straightforward to see 
whether the soft budget/ decentralized leadership cause too large or too small local 
government in terms of per capital expense.   
 
We examine the robustness of the incentive problem as well. In the benchmark mode, 
we incorporate spillover effects of public expenditure financed by lump-sum taxation. 
Later we extend the model to the case of distortional taxes. We have efficient outcome 
only in some polar cases such as when locally provided public good is pure in nature as 
is assumed in Caplan et al (2000) and when the central and local tax bases are perfectly 
overlapped leading to the vertical tax externality. The Pareto efficient outcome in a 
decentralized leadership and the too big to fail principle will be shown to be model 
specific relying on timing of decision making and on degree of spillovers.   
 
At this point, we would like to address empirical relevancy of our problem. The soft 
budget problem is not theoretical artifact but its empirical evidence is abundant. 
Dillenger et al (2001) note experiences of Latin America that rapid decentralization 
coming with separation of taxing and expenditure decisions put stress on the central 
budget and ultimately macro economic stability because of ex post rescues of indebted 
local governments. Von Hagen and Dahlbeng (2002) address the practice of baling out 
local governments in Sweden. Shleifer and Treisman (2000) give ad-hoc nature of 
federal transfers in Russia in 90s, in which enhancing tax collection/mobilization in 
region is followed by lower allocation of the transfer to that region. Martinez-Vazquez 
and Boex (2001) also raise the evidence that FFSR indeed discourages the tax effort at 
the regional level. In Germany federalism, Baretti et al (2002) present the evidence that   6
the horizontal equalization discourages the tax collection effect of the states. Applying 
both non-parametric and parametric methodology, Boger and Kerstens (1996) estimate 
the inefficiency, namely deviation of the actual cost from estimated minimum cost due 
to the dependency on intergovernmental transfers among Belgium local governments. 
Akai et al (2002) address bailing out nature of Japanese intergovernmental transfers 
(Local Allocation Tax) that have the gap filling feature. Rodden et al(2002) provides 
comprehensive case studies on the soft budget.   
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the general model 
with decentralized leadership and ex post transfer. In Section 3, we consider two 
scenarios where expenditure level is selected ex ante and tax level is selected ex ante 
and characterize the interesting results that two cases create moral hazard problems 
with opposite directions. We extend the model by introducing capital tax competition in 
Section 4. In Section 5, we analyze the general model in which two taxes by the central 
and the local governments are levied on the various types of tax bases. In Section 6, we 
also analyze the two period model to address the local government‘s incentive to borrow 
and enhance own tax base or regional economy. Section 7 considers other extensions, 
namely non-separable utility. Section 8 concludes this paper.   
 
2. Model with decentralized leadership and ex post transfer 
 
2.1  Environment  
 
The economy contains I regions. There are the central and local governments. Each 
region consists of the representative resident. Denote a size of population in region  i    7







. The residents in region i are 
endowed with a fixed amount of per capita income i y . Later we turn to the case that  i y  






i i Y y n
1
. We abstract away intra-regional preference heterogeneity here to 
focus on inter-regional conflicts of interest, but account for the case where either  i n  or 
i y (or both) may be different across regions. 
 
Public services 
There are two public goods/services, denoted by  i g  and G  in terms of per capita 
consumption. We assume that  i g   is locally provided which may generate inter-regional 
spillover, the degree of which is represented by  λ .  G  is a per capita national public 
service and is uniformly provided by the central government. We can allow for  G  to  be 
pure, however, and thus there is scale economy in the consumption without altering the 
essence of our argument.   
 
Resident’s utility   
The residents benefit from the private and public consumption. We assume that their 
preference is separable so that the residential utility in region  i is expressed by:   
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) ( λ  gives the spillover effect from all regions and  i g  is pure when  λ =1. In 
the above, the central tax rate on income  j y  is denoted by τ . We suppose that the 
local government levies the lump sum tax  i t : since  j y  is assumed to be fixed, local 
income tax gives the same result.   
 
Government’s budget constraint and Intergovernmental transfer 
The budget constraint of the local government is written as:   
  i i i i i g n S t n = + ,                                        ( 2 )   
where  i S   denotes the subsidy from the central government to the region.    We suppose 
that  i S  can go to either sign allowing maximal discretion in the grants policy. The 
negative transfer implies that the central government taxes local government. Turning 
to the central budget, it becomes:   
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.                               ( 3 )   
The central government possesses full control over  i S  so as to pursue own objective. 
We suppose that it cannot commit to the transfer policy, however, implying that  i S  is 
optimized from the ex post standpoint taking as given the ex ante local decisions as fully 
explored later.   
 
In the following benchmark model, we assume that 0 = τ to address the horizontal 
equalization nature of the transfers unless explicitly stated. This may appear ad hoc, 
but it reflects institutional features in a country where the sub-national governments 
are in charge of collecting the central and local taxes as is the case in Germany and in   9
the former socialist countries. In section 6, we re-introduce the central tax to see the 
robustness of our argument. 
For the later use, we also give overall resource constraint as follows:     












.                                ( 4 )  
 
The objectives of Central and Local governments 
The central and local governments are assumed to be benevolent so as to abstract 
political economy consideration and address the commitment problem. To be precise, 
the central government decides the transfers to maximize the utilitarian objective, i.e., 
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On the other hand, the local government aims to maximize the welfare of own region:   
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ((
1
G g n E g v t y u V
J
j







+ − + − − = ∑
=
λ λ τ .                   ( 5 . 2 )  
 
Timeline 
Timing is very important in our model, in which the decision making is divided into 
several stages. We always assume that  i S  is decided ex post in the sense of the 
decentralized leadership. We consider the two scenarios depending on whether the local 
governments ex ante chooses  i g or  i t . The remaining policy instruments including  i G  
are determined ex post. To be precise, timeline in each scenario is as follows. 
 
  Scenario A  Scenario B 
Stage 1   
(Ex ante) 
i g   is decided by the local 
government. 
i t   is decided by the local government 
   10
The central government optimizes  i S  andG   Stage 2   
(Ex post) 
i t   is determined so fulfill the 
local budget.   
i g   is determined so fulfill the local   
budget.  
Stage 3:  Given all policies implemented, residents enjoy consumption and finally 
resident’s utility is determined. 
 
In stage 2, the central government acts taking as given the ex ante decisions by local 
government: in this regard, the central government is the Stackerberg follower. In stage 
1, the local government accounts for how their ex ante choices (of  i g  or  i t ) affects the 
ex post central policy, especially ex post design of the intergovernmental transfers, as 
the Stackerberg leader, but behave in Nash manner toward the other local governments 
in the same stage.   
 
In the literature, either scenario has been supposed. Caplan et al (2000) follows our first 
scenario. In the two period setting, Goodspeed (2002) considers that sub-national 
governments borrow to expand their first period spending and raise taxes in the second 
period to make repayment. His case may be closer to Scenario A as well. On the other 
hand, Wildasin (1997) and Köthenbürger (2004) adopt the second scenario supposing 
that local tax collection effects are sunk ex ante. The present paper does not aim to 
examine which scenario is empirically plausible but to see how the timing structure 
affects the equilibrium consequences.   
 
2.2 First best optimal allocation   
 
Before illustrating the subgame perfect equilibrium, as a reference, let us consider the   11
first best allocation that is determined by maximizing the social welfare W subject to 
the resource constraint:   
W MAX
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The first best allocation is characterized by 
γ λ λ = Φ = + − = ∑
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alongside with the resource constraint. The implication of the above first-order 
conditions is straightforward:   
* c ci = ,  * g gi = ,  * G Gi =  for  all i  and N g + +  
In the case of  1 = λ ,  * g   is coincident with the Samuelson condition:   
1
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If the central government were able to commit, it could replicate the first best allocation 
optimizing the grants from the ex ante standpoint. To be more specific,  i S  including 
matching component to internalize the spillovers can be set so that   
i i i i i i g m y c g m n S + − + − =
* * ) 1 ( /  where  ) ( ' / ) ( ' ) (
* * c u Ng E n N m j i − = λ  
j m  is reduced to  N n N j / ) ( −  when  1 = λ . Therefore, the inefficiency observed in the 
following is due to the lack of the commitment of the central government and the ex 
ante strategic decisions taken at the local level.   
 
3. Benchmark case with a spillover effect of public good 
   12
In this section, we analyze the basic model with various degrees of spillovers effect of 
the local public service. Under this basic setting, ex post subsidy in the decentralized 
leadership model creates moral hazard problem corresponding to the soft budget 
problem unless the degree of spillover is perfect. We also show that the direction of the 
moral hazard, i.e., whether local government is too large or too small in terms of public 
services provided, depends on which policy instrument,  i g  (Scenario  A)  or  i t  
(Scenario B) , is decided ex ante by the local governments.   
 
In the following unless explicitly stated, we assume that 0 = τ to address the horizontal 
equalization nature of the transfers. This may appear ad hoc, but it reflects 
institutional features in a country where the sub-national governments are in charge of 
collecting the central and local taxes as are cases in Germany and in the former socialist 
countries. The central tax rate turns to be redundant in Scenario A but it can restore the 
first best under Scenario B if optimized as noted in 3.2.   
 
3.1 Scenario A: Expenditure level is selected ex ante 
 
In this section, we consider that  i g  is decided ex ante and  i t  is adjusted after the ex 
post transfer to balance the local budget with various degrees of spillovers effect of the 
local public service. Under this scenario, we establish ex post subsidy creates 
overspending at the local level unless the degree of spillover is perfect. In the following, 
we proceed backward ways starting from the second stage.   
 
Stage 2 Ex post behavior of the central government 
Since  i g  is already decided ex ante,  i t  i s  a d j u s t e d  e x  p o s t  s u c h  a s  t o  b a l a n c e  t h e    13
budget,  i i i i n S g t / − =  with  i S  being transferred from the central government. Then 
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i S NG  where  0 = τ   is assumed. The first order conditions become:   
) ( ' / / G ) n S g u'(y ) n S g u'(y j j j j i i i i Φ = − − = − − ,                       ( 8 )  
implying that the consumption level is perfectly equalized so that 
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Denote the ex post optimal level of the central public service by  G . The ex post optimal 
subsidy level is described as   
i i i i i i y n g n c n S ) 1 ( τ − − + = .                                            ( 1 0 )  
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Note that  c  and G   is determined by solving (8) and (11). Both  c  and G  are  given 
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the latter use, we state the following lemma: 
Lemma 1:   
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At this point, let us illustrate the features of the ex post optimal transfer function. 
Given that  i c  is equalized, combining the local budget and the resident’s budget 
constraints, we have 
                 i i n S /   ≡ i s =  i g + ) (M c   −  i y .                                 ( 1 3 )  
Accounting for Lemma 1, we can establish that ex post per capita transfer to region  i  
is increasing in own expense and decreases when other regions expend more:   
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Goodspeeds (2002) in the two period setting raises the possibility that (14.2) becomes 
positive. The present model reveals that his case is unlikely, but that the central 
government responds to increase of  i g   in one region by decreasing transfers to others.   
 
Substituting (13) into (2) yields  ) (M c y t i i − = . This is the resident’s budget, so we can 
interpret that the local government of region i is concerned with not own budget but the 
one of its residents whose consumption is ex post determined by the central authority. 
i t  does not depend upon own expenditure directly. The latter affects the local tax rate 
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M .That is  i t  is ex post adjusted not by own expenses 
but by the remaining resource for consumption in the economy. To make our point clear, 
imagine a small region i  so that  0 / ≈ N ni . Then  i t  become taken to be constant 
regardless of i g .     15
 
Stage 1 Ex ante Behavior of the local government 
Accounting for the ex post central policy, which is summarized by  ) (M c  and  ) (M G , 
the local governments independently select  i g   to maximize the local utility in regioni. 
Their optimization problem is expressed by:     
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Tilde designates solution to the ex ante problem. The above has straightforward 
interpretation. The right hand side is the regionally perceived benefit of the local public 
service at margin whereas the left hand side represents the marginal cost from the 
regional perspective. 
N
ni − 1   is the portion of the cost accruing to the other regions.   
 
The Sub-Game Equilibrium:   
The time consistent (subgame perfect) equilibrium is characterized by   
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~
( ' ~ G ) c u'( Φ =                                                 ( 1 6 . 1 )   
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We know that the Samuelson condition is satisfied and thus the equilibrium becomes 
the first best only if  1 = λ . Otherwise, there is tendency of over-spending of the public 
service as stated in Proposition 1:   
 
Proposition 1 
(a) When 1 < λ , *
~
*, ~ *, G G c c g g < < >  where  N g n g i i
J
i / ~
1 = Σ ≡ .  
(b) When 1 < λ ,  i g ~
 takes a larger value for smaller region, namely,  2 1
~ ~ g g >  i f    
2 1 n n < . 
(c )    i g ~





~ = <0, given  j j g g ~ =  (j≠i) 
 
For the proof, see Appendix 1. Proposition 1 is sharply in contract with Caplan et al 
(2000). They argue that the decentralized leadership achieves the efficient allocation 
but this applies only to a polar case of 1 = λ . The intuition is the following. With  1 = λ , 
the local public service has a perfect spillover effect. Therefore the level of public service 
becomes too small at the degree of  j n /N. On the other hand, the ex post subsidy from 
the central government tends to make  i g  too large at the extent of  j n /N. The two 
opposing effects perfectly offset, leading to the first best allocation. In the case of  1 < λ , 
however, the moral hazard motive due to the ex post cost sharing dominates the free 
riding one associated with spillover effect. The over-spending in per capita term is 
exacerbated in a less populated region.  i g  is excessive from our social welfare 
standpoint in that the marginal reduction enhances it. The comparison with the first 
best value  * g  is not straightforward, however The average value of  i g  in the   17
equilibrium exceeds  * g . Along with (b) of the Proposition, we have  * ~ g gi >  for 
regions with relatively smaller population. We can say that  * ~ g gi >  holds for all 
regions either when  ) (c u   is close to linear or when regions are relatively homogeneous 
in terms of population. It is conceivable, however, that the inequality is reversed in 
large regions when the utility is relatively concave. In Appendix 2, we suppose  ) (c u  
takes log-form and find the condition for  * ~ g gi >  t o  h o l d .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  
* ~ g gi >  for some large regions does not contradict (c) of Proposition 1. The latter is 
local analysis addressing the marginal change while 
* ~ g g j ><   is global comparison.   
 
It is also noteworthy that the national public service G is underprovided relative to the 
first best. Moreover,  i i n S /  per capita grant is larger in a smaller region due to that 
i i n S / = i g ~
 + c ~   −  i y  and Proposition 1(b). In this regard, smaller regions are treated 
favorably.  
  
This situation may resemble pork barrel politics model by Inman and Rubinfeld (1996) 
and Weingast et al(1981). In scenario A, both the soft budget and the pork barrel politics 
give rise to over-provisions of locally benefiting public goods. They reflect different 
institutional settings however. In the former, the ex ante inefficiency is due to lack of 
commitment of the central government whereas the latter supposes that the decision 
making within legislature is fragmented with the universal norm being adopted. In 
addition, the present model presumes a strong central authority possessing maximal 
discretion in its grants policy. On the other hand, the government is weak and 
susceptible to the regional demand in the model of pork barrel politics.     18
 
3.2 Scenario B; Tax level is selected ex ante 
 
Stage 2 Ex post behavior of the central government 
We again begin with the ex post decision making. In this alternative scenario B,  i t  is 
decided ex ante, whereas  i g  is ex post adjusted to balance the budget ; i i i i n S t g / + = . 
Taking  i t   as given, the central government chooses  i S  and  G  to  maximize 
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The above implies that the expenditure level is perfectly equalized, that is,  g g g j i ≡ = . 
In the present context,  i S works as horizontal equalization of local public services. 
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g  and  G  are determined by (17) and (18), and thus becomes the function of   19






i it n N R , namely,  ) (R g  and  ) (R G . Similar to Lemma 1, we have the 
following lemma.   
 
Lemma 2 
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Stage 1 Ex ante Behavior of the local government 
As in the previous scenario, we suppose that the local governments act strategically 
toward the ex post central policy summarized by  ) (R g  and  ) (R G  but they are Nash 
players toward one another. To be precise, each local government solves the following 
optimization with respect to its own tax rate  i t  taking  j t ( j≠i) as given:   
)) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( R G R g N E R g v t y u V MAX i i i ti
Φ + + − + − = λ λ   
The first order condition becomes   
























λ λ  (20) 
Applying lemma 2, (20) reduces to   





i λ λ + − =                             ( 2 1 )  
The right hand side is the marginal benefit of raising tax from the local standpoint that 
is discounted at the rate of  j n /N whereas the left hand side is regionally born cost of 
taxation.    20
 
Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium:   
Then the time consistent (subgame perfect) equilibrium is characterized by the system 
of equations derived from the ex ante and ex post decision makings.   
 
) ˆ ( ' ) ˆ ( ' ) ˆ ( ' ) 1 ( G g N NE g v Φ = + − λ λ                                         ( 2 2 . 1 )  
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In contrast with Scenario A, we have under-provision of the local public goods compared 





Irrespective of the degree of spillover, we have   
(a)  * ˆ *, *, ˆ G G c c g g < > <  where  N c n c i i
J
i / ˆ 1 = Σ =  
(b)  i c ˆ   takes a larger value for smaller region, namely,  2 1 ˆ ˆ c c >  if  2 1 n n < . 
(c)   i c ˆ   is excessive in the sense that 
i c i c i dc
dW
ˆ =
<0, given  j j c c ˆ = (j≠i) 
 
The proof of the above proposition is essentially the same as Proposition 1. The 
intuition is straightforward. Ex post equalization of the fiscal capacities giver rise to 
ex ante free riding motive among the regions lowering the tax collection efforts. 
Such free riding incentive is exacerbated for less populated regions as stated in 
Proposition 2(b). The upshot is that all regions end up with being unfunded in the   21
sense that both local and national public services are under-provided relative to the 
first best. We see that even with  1 = λ , the under-provision is not solved.   
 
Noting that  i i i n S t g / ˆ ˆ ˆ + =  and i i i t y c ˆ ˆ − = , per capita transfer to region i can be 
calculated by  i i i i i i y n c g t g n S − + = − = ) ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ / ˆ . From Proposition 2(b), per capita transfer 
is larger for less populated and/or less wealthy regions. This result is different from 
Wildasin (1997) that raises the case of the “too big to fail” with larger regions being 
more likely to be bailed out. The difference between the present paper and Wildasin lies 
on the following. First, the latter assumes that the central government represents 
interest of the non-bailing out regions ex post, namely pursuing the sum of these 
regions’ welfare. On the other hand, in the present model, the central government is ex 
post concerned with social welfare  W with positive weights being placed on all regions. 
Second, we consider that the central authority possesses maximal discretion ex post in 
allocating the grants across regions, the local per capita expenses being fully equalized, 
whereas in Wildasin (1997), the central government is allowed only to increase the 
transfer to the bailing out region adjusting  G   to balance the central budget, with  j S to 
other (non-bailing out) regions being kept at the first best value. We do not intend to 
discuss which model is more plausible but it is noteworthy that the too big to fail 
principle is model specific and lacks robustness. Our result that smaller regions are 
more easily rescued or treated favorably is consistent with the observation by Von 
Hagen and Dahlberg (2002) in the context of Swedish local public finance although they 
have addressed political economy consideration.   
 
Ex Post Optimization of the Central Tax:   
So far we have assumed that τ =0. This assumption is irrelevant in Scenario A since   22
the ex post central tax is redundant. For Scenario B, however, the ex post optimization 
of  τ   makes difference. The first order condition for the central tax rate is given by     
) ( ' / ) ) 1 (( ' G Y y t y u n i i i i i Φ = − − Σ τ .                  
(23) 
Suppose that regions are identical in all aspects. Then the ex post optimization gives 
) ( ' ) ( ' G c u Φ = , which is the first best allocation alongside with the resource constraint.   
 
Corollary to Proposition 2   
Assume that all regions are homogeneous. Then, independent of the ex ante choice 
of  i t , the central policy leads to the first best outcome, namely,  * c ci = ,  * g gi = , 
* G Gi =  for  all i.  
 
Along with the lack of the commitment, the absence of the ex post discretion of the 
central authority raising the tax revenue which is supposed in Wildasin (1997) and 
Köthenbürger (2004) as well contributes to our incentive problem in Scenario B. This 
corollary can be extended to the heterogeneous regions if the central tax rate can be 
differentiated among regions, i τ .  
 
It is wrong to conclude that Proposition 2 is implausible, however. In section 6, we 
discuss the situation where both the central and local taxes are distortionary and the 
central tax can be optimized ex post. It can be seen that the above Corollary is a polar 
case that holds only when the taxes are lump-sum. Otherwise, the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium under Scenario B is featured by local taxes being too low and local public 
goods being under-provided.   
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3.3 Intuition and Discussion 
 
We have considered the two scenarios when the central government designs the 
transfer policy from the ex post standpoint and possesses the discretion to pursue the ex 
post discretion. It is revealed that the timing of decision making is critical.  Under 
Scenario A with  i g   being decided ex ante, the consequence is that the local 
governments expand excessively, whereas under Scenario B in which  i t  is chosen ex 
ante, the local governments’ fiscal capacities are too small. The difference is due to the 
nature of the ex post intergovernmental transfers. In Scenario A, they lead to “cost 
sharing “, allowing each local government to export cost of its own expense to others 
generating the situation analogous to the common pool problem and thus encouraging 
over-spending ex ante. Scenario B yields the case of the ex post “Revenue sharing” 
which ex ante motivate the local government to “free-ride” on the tax collection efforts of 
the others. Given that  *
~
G G < ,  * ˆ G G <  and  0 = + ∑ G S
i i  with τ =0, total amount 
of the intergovernmental transfers become excessive relative to the first best.   
 
The soft budget literature has focused on ex post vertical fiscal tie between the 
upper and lower governments. The present model shows, however, that such ex post 
vertical interaction brings about the horizontal externalities once we incorporate 
general equilibrium effect, namely ex post increase in the transfer being born 
nation-wide. The ex ante regional decisions of expanding  j g  gives rise to “negative” 
externalities to others in Scenario A whereas Scenario B gives the case that the ex ante 
tax collection efforts create positive externalities contributing to the ex post shared fund. 
Such horizontal externalities have been addressed by the decentralization leadership 
literature in which the externalities associated with the ex post cost sharing are exactly   24
matched with those arising from the free riding motive when  j g  is a pure public good. 
The present model synthesizing the two literature establishes that the ex ante 
inefficiency raised by the soft budget literature is robust with the Pareto optimality in 
the decentralized leadership being a polar case although the direction of the ex ante 
distortions relies on the timeline of decisions.   
 
Our model formulated closer to the decentralized leadership one differs from the 
standard setting of the soft budget problem in a few aspects. First, we do not account for 
uncertainty associated with local public projects and with the central government’s 
commitment ability. Such uncertainty can be easily incorporated. With the uncertainty 
of the first sort, namely project costs, intergovernmental transfers serve as insurance 
device, but introduce some moral hazard behavior taking excessive risk at the local level 
that must be incorporated from the second best standpoint. In the absence of 
commitment, however, the central government will allocate grants based upon cost 
realizations, leading to the cost sharing as described under Scenario A, which induces 
local governments to undertake too risky projects. We can also consider two types of the 
center with and without commitment, and then the ex ante decisions of local 
governments rely on their prospect for central government type.   
 
Second, the soft budget literature supposes that the ex post decision of bailing out 
indebted or overspending regions is occasional and explicit involving policy change from 
the ex ante announcement, whereas such deviation is not obvious in the present model. 
Our model allows that the ex post rescue can be frequent and implicit with grants 
formula being manipulated in a way to reflect the ex post optimum; the formula of 
intergovernmental transfers could be math to rationalize an intended allocation 
(Bird(1994)). More generous transfers can be made to compensate overspending regions   25
but in the name of internalizing spillovers and/or accounting for region specific fiscal 
needs.  
 
To see it more closely, note that in the sub-game perfect equilibrium, the ex post 
transfers can be expressed in terms of regional population and income. Under Scenario 
A, for instance, we have  i i n S /   ≡ i s ~
=  ) ( ~
i n g + c ~   −  i y  where  i g ~
= ) ( ~
i n g  and  ) ( ~
i n g is 
decreasing in  i n . The central government may then announce that  i s ~
 reflects the 
regional fiscal needs as function of  i n   alongside with regional income/fiscal capacity  i y  
and lump-sum component c ~ , although of course, it is  i s =  i g + ) (M c − i y  that is 
anticipated by the local governments. The ex post formula based transfer may explicitly 
contain the cost sharing component, say  N n m i i / 1 ~ − =   But this ex post optimal 
matching rate differs from the prospective rate to internalize the spillover 
' / ' ) ( u E n N m j i − = λ . The soft or hard budget does not reply on the presence or absence 
of cost sharing but upon whether the matching rate is optimized from ex ante or ex post 
standpoints. We can discuss likewise under Scenario B as well.   
 
One may claim that ex post the local governments are still constrained by own 
budgets given that  i t  is adjusted ex post after the transfer so that  i i i i n S g t /
~
− =  for 
instance under Scenario A. As illustrated in Section 3, however, if we substitute  i s = 
i g + ) (M c − i y  into this local budget constraint, we obtain  i t = ) (M c − i y , which is the 
constraint perceived by the local governments ex ante. Along with the central 
optimization ex post,  ) (M c  is determined dependent upon (11). This in turn implies   26
that the ex ante decisions of the local governments are constrained by the economic 
wide resource constraint with the governments’ budgets being integrated ex post 
through the transfers, but not by own budget . In this regard, the local budgets are 
softened (from the ex ante perspective).   
 
We have supposed that the central government is benevolent and thus the soft 
budget problem is akin to the Samaritan’s Dilemma. The two are not synonymous, 
however. The former could arise even when the incumbent central government is 
politically motivated, say to assure re-election as formulated in Goodspeed (2002). The 
ex post grants allocation will then be favorable to politically influential regions. Ex ante 
politically favored regions will shark and/or the local governments may act strategically 
to enhance the ex post favor say undertaking lobbying activities.     
 
A possible objection against the strategic behavior of the local governments may be 
that it is informationally demanding for individual local governments to foresee how the 
central grants policy responds to their ex ante choices especially when the grants are 
determined upon a complicated formula and especially when there are a large number 
of regions. All we need to establish our argument is, however, the local governments' 
prospect of the central authority ultimately bearing the fiscal burden to pursue the 
inter-regional equity rather than their detailed knowledge of the computation of ex post 
transfers.  
 
4 Capital Tax Competition   
 
In the benchmark model, we have assumed that the local government can levy 
lump-sum tax. In the following, we turn to the case where local governments finances   27
their expenses with their tax base being inter-regionally mobile giving rise to tax 
competition among regions.   
 
The regions faces identical production function per person, ) K ( f i , where  i K  is a 
capital level per person and  ) K ( f i is strictly concave. Then income per person 
becomes K K K f K f y i i i i ρ + − = ) ( ' ) ( , where  ρ  is net of tax return on capital and  K  is 
initial endowment per person and the capital endowment is assumed to be equally 
distributed among regions. In the present model, therefore, inter-regional heterogeneity 
arises solely due to difference in regional population.     
 
Given the tax rate on capital,  i t , the profit maximizing company selects the level of 
capital according to  i i t ρ ) K ( ' f + = . This determines the capital demand, which is 
described as  ) t ρ ( k K i i + =  with  ' ' / 1 ' f k = <0. 
 
Capital market equilibrium is given by ∑ +
i
i i t k n ) (ρ =∑
i
iK n , which determines the 
level of capital return per unit as a function of capital tax rates in all regions, namely, 
) ,...... ( 1 I t t ρ ρ =  with  i t ∂ ∂ / ρ <0. It is well known that the absolute value of  i t ∂ ∂ / ρ  is 
larger for more populated regions. Accounting for the equilibrium condition, per capita 
capital and income in each region are described as  ) ) ,...... ( ( 1 i I i t t t k K + = ρ , 
) ), ,...... ( ( 1 i I i t t t y y ρ = . 
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4.1 Scenario A; Expenditure level is selected ex ante   
 
Stage 2 Ex post behavior of the central government 
 
Given that  i g   is decided ex ante and  i S  is  transferred,  i t   is adjusted such as to 
balance the budget,  i i i i I i i i S g n t t t K n t − = + ) ) ,...... ( ( 1 ρ , implying that if  i i i S g n −   is same in 
all regions, the tax rates become identical among them.   
 
Noting  i i y c = in this section, the central government aim to maximize  W subject to its 
budget constraint with respect to  i S  and G :  
[] ∑
=
Φ + + =
I
i
i i N i G S G g v t t t y u n W MAX
i 1
1 ) ( ) ( )) ), ,...... ( ( ( ρ
　
 






i S NG .  
It is straightforward to see that  t ti =  achieves efficient allocation of capital across 
regions, equalizing the marginal productivities and thus maximizing the national 
output. In addition,  t ti =  leads to the equalization of  i i y c = . The technology or per 
capital production, which is identical among regions, leads to  K K K j i = = , which in 
turn equalize the wages. The consumption equalization is desirable from the equity or 
social welfare maximizing standpoint. Given this situation, the ex post optimum is to 
set the subsidy so as to realize t ti = .  






i S NG  and   29







i ig n NG
N K
t . On the other hand, income per 
person is given by  K K K f K f y yi ρ + − = = ) ( ' ) ( , which reduces to:   
  c g n NG
N
K f K t K f y y
I
i
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i i i G G g v g n NG
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K f u n G g c U n W MAX
11 1
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1
) ( ( ) , , (
　
  
leading to the first order condition of   
  ) ( ' ) ( G c u' Φ =                                                      ( 2 5 ) .  
Denote equalized consumption and the central public service by  c  andG , which are 
determined by (25) and  M g n
N
K f G c
I
i
i i ≡ − = + ∑
=1
1
) (  and given as the function of 
M , namely,  ) (M c  and  ) (M G   to which Lemma 1 applies. . 
 
Stage 1 Ex ante Behavior of the local government 
 
Turn to Stage 1. Ex ante, each local government solves the following:   
 
)) ( ( ) ( ) ( ( M G g v M c u V MAX i i gi
Φ + + =   
The first order condition becomes 
















                              ( 2 6 )  
Noting Lemma 1, the above reduces to     30
) ~ ( ' ) ~ ( ' i
i g v c u
N
n
= .                                                      ( 2 7 )  
The time consistent (subgame perfect) equilibrium is characterized by   
)
~
( ' ~ G ) c u'( Φ = ,  ) ~ ( ' ) ~ ( ' i
i g v c u
N
n
= ,  ) ( ~ )
~ ~ (
1





= + + .           ( 2 8 )  
Comparing with the condition of the first best allocation, we can establish Proposition 3:   
 
Proposition 3 
 (a)  *
~
*, ~ *, G G c c g g < < >  where  N g n g i i
J
i / ~
1 = Σ = . 
(b)  i g ~   takes a larger value for smaller region, namely,  2 1
~ ~ g g >  if  2 1 n n < . 
 (c  )   i g ~   is over-provided in the sense that 





~ = <0  
 
In the presence of capital tax competition, we have the same results with the local 
public service being excessive whereas the national public services being 
under-provided. It is noteworthy that this result is as opposed to the case of standard 
tax competition.   
 
4.2 Scenario B; Tax level is selected ex ante 
 
This is the scenario considered in Köthenbürger (2004). Our model is different in that 
we account for the heterogeneity across regions in terms of regional population whereas 
Köthenbürger (2004) focuses on the symmetric equilibrium with identical regions.   
 
Stage 2 Ex post behavior of the central government 
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Given that  i t  is decided ex ante and  i S  is transferred,  i g  is adjusted to balance the 
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where  
           
i
i
i I i i i n
S
t t t K t g + + = ) ) ,...... ( ( 1 ρ  







i S NG , giving rise to the following first order conditions for  G  and  i S .  
          ) ( ' ) ) ( ( ' ) ) ( ( ' G
n
S
t K t v
n
S






i i i Φ = + + = + + ρ ρ .                 ( 2 9 )  
Again the expenditure level is perfectly equalized, that is,  g g g j i ≡ = .  i S  works  as 
horizontal equalization of local public services.   





i − + = ) (ρ  into the central budget constraint and re-arranging 
yield () 0 ) (
1










i i i i t K t n g G N
1
) ( ) ( ρ                           ( 3 0 )  
g  and G   are determined by solving the above (29) and (30), so that they are given as 
the function of   







i I i i i t t t K t n N R ρ                           ( 3 1 )    32





+ = 1 ,                                                 ( 3 2 )  
namely., Lemma 2 holds. 
 
Stage 1 Ex ante Behavior of the local government 
 
Accounting for the ex post central policy, which is summarized by  ) (R g  and  ) (R G , at 
stage 1, the local governments chooses  i t   to maximize the local utility in regioni ,:  
)) ( ( )) ( ( ) ( R G R g v y u V MAX i i ti
Φ + + =  . 
The first order condition becomes   
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  (34) 
Let us focus on the symmetric equilibrium such that  K K K j i = = . Then  t ti =  and  we 












c u =   implying 
that 
* ˆ i i g g < . Then in the symmetric equilibrium, the time consistent (subgame perfect) 
equilibrium is characterized by   





i =  and  Y G g I c
I
i
i = + + ∑
=
) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
1
                   ( 3 5 )    33
The comparison with the first best condition establishes that  * ˆ g g < , i.e, 
under-provision of the local public service. This Scenario is the one of Köthenbürger 
(2004) addressing that the ex post discretionary transfer may not resolve the problem of 
under-taxation due to capital tax competition.     
 
The model can be easily extended to the case of heterogeneous regions with respect to 
the productivity. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the production function is 







. Then the equilibrium condition for the 
ex ante choice of the tax rate is written as:   
N
n






i ) ( ' ) (
1






− +  
If region  i is exporting capital and thus  K Ki < , the parenthesis on the left hand side is 
larger than unity, and along with the right hand side representing the free riding 
motive due to the ex post revenue sharing, we have the under-provision ofg . In the case 
that the region imports the capital, on the other hand, the strategic motive of exporting 
capital tax burden to the non-residents through lowering the net of tax return ρ leads 
such a region to excessively increase  i t , which must be compared with the free riding 
motive.  
 
Proposition 4:   
[1] Köthenbürger (2004); Assume the symmetry so that K K K j i = = . Then, even in the 
case with distortionary taxation, we have the same results, which are 
(a)  * ˆ *, ˆ *, ˆ G G c c g g i < > <  
(b)  i c ˆ   takes a larger value for smaller region, namely,  2 1 ˆ ˆ c c >  if  2 1 n n < .   34
 
[2] Consider that regions differ in terms of productivity, but assume that the production 
technology is quadratic. Then more productive region importing more capital from the 
outside or region with less endowment of capital levies a lower tax rate, exacerbating 
the free riding due to the ex post revenue sharing.   
 
5 Distortionary Central and Local Taxes 
 
Now we allow the central tax rate to be optimized ex post but suppose that the 
central and local taxes are distortionary. We consider the equilibrium consequence 
under Scenario B in which local tax rates are decided ex ante. For the sake of simplicity, 
we assume that all regions are identical so that we can focus on the symmetric 
equilibrium. In Corollary to Proposition 2, it is stated that the first best can be achieved 
once  τ  is optimized ex post. It is established however that this is not valid in the 
present context, but the equilibrium is characterized by under taxation.   
 
Distortionary Taxes:   
We consider that the per capita central and local tax bases denoted by  i b  and  i B  are 
elastic with respect to the tax rates so that   
) , ( τ i i t b b ≡  and  ) , ( τ i i t B B ≡ .                                   ( 3 6 )  
with   










                          
where   i t  and τ   are respectively local and central tax rates. If  τ   is wage income tax 
rate, labor supply may be declining with it being raised and thus lower wage income  i B . 
We can imagine other margins of response to taxation. Instead of discouraging working 
incentive, the tax may induce tax planning activities such as rearranging their income 
to tax favorable forms, which in turn decreases taxable income. The present model 
incorporates general behavioral response as has been formulated in Slemrod and 
Kopczuk (2002). We can interpret elasticity of the local tax base likewise.   
 
Tax Externalities:  
The distortionary nature does not only give rise to economic cost of taxation but also   35
may lead to vertical tax externalities that may be positive or negative. Beside the 
vertical one, we may have horizontal tax externality among local governments. 
Köthenbürger (2004) consider capital tax competition in the context of decentralized 
leadership. In the following we abstract inter-regional competition to highlight our 
point.  
 
Suppose that the central and local governments share the same tax base. It is known 
that unilateral tax increase by one government imposes negative externality on tax 
revenue to another level government tax base being decreased (Boadway and Keen 
(1996)). If this is so, we can write  ) ( ) ( τ τ + = + i i t B t b
) , ( τ i t bwith b’=B’<0. In more general 
context, their tax bases may be imperfectly overlapped. For instance, the central 
government levies comprehensive income tax while local income taxation is limited to 
payroll. Alternatively, wage income taxation may be exclusive to the center and local 
governments may rely on consumption taxes. Even so, the tax externalities are present. 
They disappear when the central and local tax bases are perfectly separated, i.e., the 
two level government levy different goods that are independent one another.   
 
Resident’s utility   
Given the tax parameters, the residents maximize own utilities that give arise to the 
















,                                    ( 3 7 )  
where  i λ  is marginal utility of income.  The total utility including benefits of the 
public goods can be expressed by 
  ) ( ) ( ) , ( G g v t u U i i Φ + + = τ .                                          ( 3 8 )  
 
Government’s budget constraint 
The budget constraint of the local government is written as:   
  i i i i i i g n S b t n = +                                      ( 3 9 )  









i B n S NG
1 1
τ .                                   ( 4 0 )   
Ex post, the central government decides  i S  that effectively integrates the central and 
local budgets to yield:   











i i b t n B n g n NG
1 1 1
τ                             ( 4 1 )   
 
Stage 2 Ex post behavior of governments 
Given that  i t  is decided by the local government ex ante, the behavior of the central 























j j i i i G g G g n E g v t u n W MAX
i 11
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ~ λ λ τ
τ   
subject to (41) . The first order conditions for  G  and  i g  become 
µ λ λ λ λ = Φ = + − = + − ∑ ∑
= =
) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' ) ( ' ) 1 (
1 1






i i i       ( 4 2 )  
where  µ   is the Lagrangian multiplier, implying that the expenditure level is perfectly 




































τ µ .                            ( 4 3 )  
In the symmetric equilibrium, we have   
   B tb B B α τ µ τ τ = + + ) (                                                 ( 4 4 )  
Denoting by  G  and  g  respectively ex post optimums of the central and local public 









i j b t n B n g G N
1 1
) ( τ                                            ( 4 5 )  
 
Stage 1 Ex ante Behavior of the local government 
Accounting for the ex post central policy, the local governments chooses  i t  to  maximize 
own residents’ utility, that is,   
{ } [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( G g N E g v t u V MAX i i ti
Φ + + − + = λ λ τ  
By using (42) and (44), in the symmetry, we have3 
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τ τ τ τ ) ( ) ( ) ( + + + + + = + . 
Therefore, using (44), we have (46) as follows. 
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The second equality is for the later use. Denote by  tˆ the symmetric equilibrium value 
of the local tax rate. If the solution is interior, i.e.,  tˆ>0, we establish:   
b tb B b
N
n
t t α τ µ = + + ) (                                    ( 4 7 )   
(47) is not always the case. At this point, let us consider two polar cases. First assume 
that neither t  nor τ  is distortionary, so that  0 = = = = τ τ B B b b t t . Then the last 
equality in (46) reduces to 






i α .                                      ( 4 8 )   
This implies that we establish  0 ˆ = t  given  that t   is restricted to non-negative. Second,   
both  t and  τ  are levied on the completely overlapped tax base,  τ τ B B b b t t = = = . 
Again, (46) becomes coincident with (48). Therefore, we have  0 ˆ = t   in this case as well.   
 
Welfare implication   
The welfare implication of the equilibrium can be examined by simultaneously 
differentiating  ) ( ) ( ) , ( ~ G g v t u V Φ + + = τ   with respect to t accounting for  tb B g G + = + τ  
and evaluating the derivative at  t t ˆ = :  
() t t
t t
tb B b b
dt
dV




                                             ( 4 9 )  
First consider the case of  0 ˆ > t . Then substituting (47), the above reduces to   
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ˆ









α α ,                                               ( 5 0 )    39
which implies that tˆ  is too small. Second, suppose that we have  0 ˆ = t  in the 






⎛ − = + − + =
= =













.                       ( 5 1 )  
  Now we apply the Slutsky decomposition as M
c
t t bB B B − =  and  M
c BB B B − = τ τ , where 
c
t B  and 
c Bτ   represent the compensated term of  t B and  τ B .   M B   is the income effect 
term. Then we can establish:   
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τ τ ε = . The last equality comes from 
c
t
c B b = τ . 
b




τ ε   are the compensated elasticities of the local and the central tax bases, respectively 
with respect to  τ  with 
B




τ ε   where the sign of the 
latter depends on whether the central tax base is substitute or complementary with the 






τ ε  s o  ( 5 2 )  i s  z e r o  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  t h e  w e l f a r e  i s  m a x i m i z e d  i n  t h e  
equilibrium if the tax bases are completely overlapped or the tax bases are not elastic 
i.e., the elasticities are zero. In so far as 
B b
τ τ ε ε > , (52) takes positive value so the 




Suppose that the central tax is optimized ex post.     40
(a) When the central and local tax bases are completely overlapped so that 
B b
τ τ ε ε =  
or both taxes are non-distortionary, we have  0 ˆ = t , which is the second best optimal in 
the former and the first best in the latter.   
(b) Insofar as 
B b
τ τ ε ε > ,  tˆ  is too low, compared with the social optimal level.   
 
Except polar cases in Proposition 5(a), which corresponds to the case discussed in 
Corollary to Proposition 2, we can conclude that the under-taxation under Scenario B is 
relevant characteristic when the central tax and transfer policies are optimized from ex 
post standpoint which is foreseen ex ante by the local governments.   
 
6 Two Period Model: Investment for enhancing Tax Base   
 
Finally we consider another type dynamic model with two periods and investment. We 
show that the similar inefficiency by soft budget constraint is created. This inefficiency 
is derived by the ex ante decision of investment in the first period and ex post bailout in 
the second period, different from the previous models. Instead, we examine two cases 
with and without local government borrowing.   
 
6.1 Basic Setting 
 
Consider that the economy lasts two periods. In the first period, each local government 
spends 
g I , public investment, that enhances the regional production in the second 
period and  g , the first period public consumption. In the following,  i G represents the 
local public service for the consumption purpose in the second period. We assume that 
the regional production, that is, the regional income, in the second period is endogenous   41
and produced by the first period public investment as follows;  ) (
g
i i I y y = .  
  




i c  and 
t
i t , private consumption and local tax level in region i  in time t . 
Initial endowment in each region is denoted by  i z . Then consumption in each period 
can be written as 
1 1
i i i t z c − = , 
2 2 ) ( i
g
i i t I y c − =                                               ( 5 3 )  
Assuming that resident’s utility is from consumption and public good in each period and 
is separable, utility in region  i   is given by:   








i i i i i i i i G t I y u g v t z u G g c c U Φ + − + + − = ,                  ( 5 4 )  
where the discount rate is assumed to be zero. 
 
Government’s budget constraint and Intergovernmental transfer 
 
The budget constraint of the local government in period 1 becomes   
g
i i i i I g b t + = +
1 ,                                                           ( 5 5 )  
where  i b   represents local borrowing per level capita. The budget constraint in period 2 
becomes  
i i i i i G b n S t = − + /
2 ,                                                        ( 5 6 )  
where, for simplicity, the interest rate for the borrowing is assumed to be zero and  i S  
denotes the subsidy from the central government to the region, similar to the former 
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negative transfer implies that the central government taxes local government. The 
central government possesses full discretion over  i S   so as to maximize own objective.   
 
The objectives of Central and Local governments 
 
The central government decides the transfer level such as to maximize the total utility 
of regions, that is, ∑
i
i i i i G g c c U n ) , , , (
2 1 . The local government, on the other hand,  
decides the level of public services such as to maximize the utility of own region, that is, 
) , , , (
2 1
i i i G g c c U , which is,   








i i i i i i i i G t I y u g v t z u G g c c U Φ + − + + − = .                ( 5 7 )  
Accounting for the local budget constraint, it reduces to:   








i i i i i i i b n S t t I y u g v b I g z u G g c c U − + Φ + − + + + − − = .  (58) 
 
Given this basic setting, we analyze the effect of ex post transfer by the central 
government on the local government ex ante decision of 
g
i I  and  i b . We examine two 
cases where (i)  i b  is ex ante regulated by the central government and (ii)  i b  is freely 
issued. 
 
6.2 First best optimal allocation 
 
As a benchmark, let us consider the first best allocation that is determined by 
maximizing the social welfare  W subject to the resource constraint:   
∑ =
i
i i i i i
I G g c c
G g c c U n W MAX
g
i i i i i
) , , , (
2 1
, , , ,
2 1     43
subject to  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = = = = =























i i z n I y n G n c n I n g n c n
1 1 1 1
2
1 1 1
1 ) (  . 
 
The first best allocation is characterized by 




1 G c u g v c u Φ = = =  and  1 *) * ( ' =
g
i I y               ( 5 9 )  
 
6.3 Ex Post Behavior of the central and local governments   
 
Given that  ) (
g
i I y  and  i b   are decided ex ante and  i S   is transferred, the local 
government decides 
2
i t   to maximize the ex post, second period regional utility,   
) / ( ) ) ( (
2 2




b n S t t I y u MAX
i
− + Φ + − ,  
The first order condition becomes 
  ) / ( ' ) ) ( ( '
2 2
2 i i i i i
g
i b n S t t I y u − + Φ = − .                                    ( 6 0 )  
The central government chooses  i S  to maximize ex post social welfare subject to the 
budget constraint, which is 
{} ∑
=
− + Φ + −
I
i
i i i i i
g
i i S b n S t t I y u n MAX
i 1
2 2






i S . 
The first order condition becomes   
) ( ' ) ( ' j i G G Φ = Φ .                                                    ( 6 1 )   
The second period public service is perfectly equalized ex post,  G Gi = . Noting that 
(60), we show that the second period consumption in each region is also perfectly 
equalized ex post, that is, 
2 2 c ci = . 
The ex post optimal subsidy level is described as     44
i i
g
i i i i i b n I y n G n c n S + − + = ) (
2 .                                         ( 6 2 )  
Inserting this into the central budget, we have   







i i b I y n c N G N − = + ∑
=
.                                          ( 6 3 )  
As in the benchmark case, 
2 c  and G   are determined by solving (60) and(63), and can 
be written as  ) (







i i b I y n
N
Z − ≡ ∑
=







1 ,                                                        ( 6 4 )  
similar to Lemma 1. 
 
Now we can consider the effect of the borrowing in the first period on the ex post 
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i i                                  ( 6 5 )  
Again the result is different from Goodspeed (2003) that addresses the possibility that 
increasing one region’s debt could raise the ex post transfer to another region.   
. 
6.4 Ex ante Behavior of the local government   
 
Case (i):  i b   is centrally regulated:   
 
Accounting for the ex post central policy, which is summarized by  ) (
2 Z c  and  ) (Z G .   45
The local governments chooses  i g  and 
g
i I and maximize the local utility in regioni , 
that is,   
)) ( ( )) ( ( ) ( ) (
2
2 1 Z G Z c u g v b I g z u V MAX i i
g




Φ + + + + − − =  given  i b .  
The first order conditions become   

















c u g v + = =                            ( 6 6 )  
The central government regulates  i b  to maximize the social welfare  W  but taking as 
given the local policy decisions; i.e. it acts in Nash manner as the local governments do 
one another. Then we have another condition   




1 c u c u i = .                                                     ( 6 7 )  









= .                                                      ( 6 8 )  
 Comparing with the first best allocation, the resource allocation of 
1
i c  and 
2
i c  is 




i I I < .  
 
Proposition 6 









  takes a smaller value for smaller region, namely, 
g g I I 2 1
~ ~
<  if  2 1 n n < . 
 
Case (ii):  i b   is freely issued 
 
Now the local government is granted free hand to borrow ex ante. The regional 
optimization leads to the following first order conditions:     46




1 Z c u
N
n
c u g v
i
i i = = ,  ) ( ( ' )) ( ( '
2
2 Z G Z c u Φ = ) and  1 ) ( ' =
g
i I y .   (69) 













i = ,  ) ~ ( ' ) ~ ( '
1
1 i i c u g v = ,  1 ) ( ' =
g
i I y          ( 7 0 )  
alongside with the resource constraint. Comparing with the condition of the first best 
allocation, we have Proposition 7:   
 
Proposition 7 




i I I = ,  * * b b > , * * ~ 2 2 c c < ,  * *
~




1 = Σ ≡ .  
(b) 
1 ~





~ ~ g g <  if  2 1 n n < . 
(c )    i b
~
  is over-provided in the sense that 






= <0  
 
Proof  
Suppose  * * b b ≤ . Then, similar to Lemma 1, this implies that  * *
~
*, * ~ 2 2 G G c c ≥ ≥ . 
Then the time consistent (subgame perfect) equilibrium conditions implies 
* * ~ *, * ~ 1 1
i i g g c c > > . On the other hand, the total budget constraint in period 1 for all 
regions becomes  )








i i i i i I z c g n b N , which leads to  * * b b > . This 
contradicts however  * * b b ≤ .  
 
The social welfare in the equilibrium is given by:     47
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N
Z − ≡ ∑
=
. Differentiating above with respect to  i b
~
 and 
evaluating the equilibrium establish:   
         ) ~ ( ' 1 ) ~ ( ' ) ~ ( '
1 2 2 c u
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n












⎛ − = − = < 0                              ( 7 2 )  



















+ = , and the second equality 
comes from equilibrium conditions. QED 
 
 
The above two propositions reveal the trade off associated with the restriction on the 
local borrowing when intergovernmental transfer is discretionary being optimized from 
the ex post stand point. The central regulation on  i b  prevents the over-borrowing at 
the local level but discourages the investment to enhance the tax base due to the ex post 
revenue sharing. On the other hand, the ex ante local discretion on  i b  leads to the 
over-borrowing because of the ex post cost sharing whereas the public investment turns 
to be optimal.   
 
7 Other Extension: Non-Separable Utility 
 
We have supposed that the private consumption,  c, is separable from the local public 
service,  g , which leads to ex post equalization of the private consumption under 
Scenario A and of the local public spending under Scenario B. In the following, we are 
back to the benchmark model but abstract inter-regional spillovers for simplicity. 
Instead we drop this assumption and consider a more general form of the utility 
function, that is,  ) ( ) , ( ) , , ( G g c u G g c U i i i i Φ + = , where  i i i t y c − = . Our focus is on 
Scenario A.     48
 
Stage 2 Ex post behavior of governments 
 
At stage 2, given  i g , the central government chooses  i S  and  G to maximize 
W subject to the budget constraint:   
[] ∑
= Φ + − − =
I
i
i i i i i G i S G g n S g y u W MAX
1 ) ( ) , / (






i S NG . 
The first order conditions are   
) ( ' , / , / G ) g n S g (y u ) g n S g (y u j j j j j c i i i i i c Φ = − − = − − =µ                           ( 7 3 )  
where  µ   is the Lagrange multiplier of the central budget.   
 
The private consumption is not necessarily equalized among the regions and its extent 
which the consumption level is equalized depends on the relative level of  i g  among 
regions and the degree of complementarity or substitutability between consumption and 
the local public service. It is immediate to see that   
 
j i c c ≥  for  all  j i,  such  that  j i g g ≥  if  0 > cg u ,                      ( 7 4 . 1 )  
j i c c ≥  for  all  j i,  such  that  j i g g ≤  if  0 < cg u .                      ( 7 4 . 2 )  
 
Inserting the ex post optimal subsidy,  i i i i i i i y n g n c n S − + = , into the central budget and 
rearranging,  we have  ∑ ∑






i i g n Y c n NG
1 1 . Making use of this resource constraint 
and  µ = Φ = = ) ( ' , , G ) g (c u ) g (c u j j c i i c , we can obtain  i c  and  G . Totally 
differentiating each of the first order conditions gives:     49
dG G d ) ( ' ' Φ = µ ,  i i i cg i i i cc )dg g (c u )dc g (c u d , , + = µ j j j cc )dc g (c u d , = µ ,        ( 7 5 )  
Inserting to i i
I
i j
j j i i dg n dc n dc n NdG = + + ∑
≠
, we have   
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Stage 1 Ex ante Behavior of the local government 
 
At stage 1, the local government solves the following:   
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, we can derive the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 8 
(a)  * ~ g gi >  if  0 > cg u . 
(b) If  0 << cg u ,  * ~ g gi <   could be the case.   
Therefore, our argument of excessively large local spending under Scenario A can be 
extended to the case of non-separable preferences when public and private consumption 
are complementary. If the two are substitute, however, there could arise the 
under-provision of  i g , reversing the direction of the ex ante distortion.   
 
8. Conclusion 
The decentralized leadership literature has noted that ex post optimized transfers  
serve to internalize fiscal externalities associated with local spending (Caplan et al 
(2004)) or local taxation (Köthenbürger (2004)), whereas the soft budget literature   51
raises distortion on the regional ex ante incentives in the anticipation of the ex post 
bailing out or cost/revenue sharing arrangement. The two literatures address the 
commitment issue of the central transfer policy which is characterized by a sequential 
game with the local level governments as Stakelberg leader to the central authority. The 
present paper aims to synthesize them, both of which address the commitment problem. 
Our major findings are that (i) direction of the ex ante distortion relies on what policy 
instrument is decided ex ante at the local level, i.e., tax revenue raising effort or local 
spending, and (ii) except the extreme situations, the lack of the central government 
commitment to own transfer policy leads to inefficiency, either under taxation or 
over-spending relative to the first best or the commitment solution.   
 
In the federalism literature, however, it is only in the last decade that more attention 
has been paid on the incentive problem arising from the lack of commitment or ex post 
discretion in the intergovernmental transfers. We should not take for granted the 
commitment ability of the central authority, i.e., its ability to design transfers from the 
ex ante standpoint. With local level governments gaining more autonomy and discretion 
within their jurisdictions through fiscal decentralization in many countries, the soft 
budget problem will become real not just a theoretical artifact as long as the fiscal tie 
between governments remains discretionary, so serious consideration is needed on how 
to assure the hard budget at the local level.   
 
Appendix 1:Proof of Proposition 1:   
(a)  Suppose  * g g ≤ . Then Lemma 1 implies that  . Then comparing (6) and (15) leads to:   





= + − λ λ ≦ ) ( ' ) ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( '
* * * Ng NE g v c u λ λ + − =       ( A . 1 . 1 )    52
Note that  * g g ≤  and  i n N / >1. Thus when  1 < λ , the above equation holds only if  
* ~ g gi > for all i. This contradicts however  * g g ≤ .  
(b)  It is immediate from (11).   
(c)  The social welfare in the equilibrium is given by:   
      ))
~
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M . Differentiating above with respect to  i g ~
 and evaluating 
the equilibrium establish:   

















⎛ − = − + − = λ λ < 0             ( A . 1 . 3 )  
In the first equality, we use Lemma 1 and the second equality comes from (15). QED 
 
Appendix 2:Example:   
 
In this appendix, we provide the example to compare the sub-game perfect solution with 
the fist best one. For simplicity, assume that there is no spillover, namely  0 = λ . We 
specify the utility function as follows. 
) log( ) log( ) log( ) , , ( G g c G g c U i i i i + + =                   ( A . 2 . 1 )  
The first best allocation is characterized by  * * * G g c = = . Equation (4), overall 
resource constraint, implies   
Y G g c N = + + *) * * (                              ( A . 2 . 2 )  
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A.2.1 Scenario A: Expenditure level is selected ex ante 
From ex post behavior of the central government at Stage 2, Equation (8) implies   
G c = . 
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Result 1 





*= , we have the following result. 
* ~ g gi >
<








where  I   represents the number of regions.   
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G c = = <
+
= = ,  
which means that the consumption level and the central public good is larger than the 
optimal levels. 
 
A.2.2 Scenario B; Tax level is selected ex ante 
 
From ex post behavior of the central government at Stage 2, Equation (20) implies   
G g = . 
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Result 2   55





*= , we have the following result.  
* ˆ c ci >
<








where  I   represents the number of regions. 
 
  The relatively larger region consumes less, compared with the first best allocation. In 











G g = = <
+
= = ,  
which means that the local public good and the central public good is larger than the 
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, means that the local public goods in Scenario A and the consumption 
level in Scenario B are too large. On the other hand, if population is concentrated   56
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